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DO NOT RESUSCITATE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT'S RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the physician has determined the time and man-
ner of a terminally ill patient's death,1 although the patient nomi-
nally maintained the right to control medical treatment through the
exercise of informed consent.2 Informed consent assumes that only
the patient can truly weigh all the relevant factors involved in a per-
sonal treatment decision. In forgoing treatment, a terminally ill pa-
tient considers not only the medical factors involved, but also moral,
ethical, religious, and familial values. The importance of these non-
medical considerations mandate patient participation in the treat-
ment decision-making process.3
The right to determine treatment has evolved beyond the com-
mon law doctrine of informed consent to become a right of privacy
protected by the federal Constitution. This "right of self-determi-
nation" allows competent patients to evaluate their medical condi-
tion, weigh other relevant factors, and then determine their
treatment preference. Further, more than half of the states have en-
acted "Do Not Resuscitate" (DNR) statutes recognizing a terminally
ill patient's right to refuse treatment and thereby determine the
manner of their death.4
I Note, Medico-Legal Implications of Orders Not To Resuscitate, 31 CAmr. U.L. REV. 515
(1982) (authored by Nancy Tecklenburg).
2 See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
3 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 128 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
4 Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation provid-
ing for living wills and/or DNR orders: see ALA. CODE §§ 22-8-1 to -10 (1984); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218
(Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 & Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-571 to -
575 (1989); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2202
to -2213 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to .15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-
32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1985 & Supp.
1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 701-709 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65:28, 101-109 (1985); LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2921-
2931 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-102 to -104 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.540 to .730
(Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 90-320 to -322 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp. 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to .090
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Incompetent patients, however, raise special problems as to the
right of self-determination because they lack the ability to appreci-
ate medical and non-medical factors, and to formulate and commu-
nicate their treatment preferences. 5 Some courts have held that
only competent patients have a right of self-determination and that
such patients lose this right upon losing capacity.6 Other courts
have held that the right of self-determination extends to incompe-
tent patients, through a surrogate, usually a family member, who
exercises the right for the patient. 7 The patient's surrogate uses a
"substituted judgment" test in which the surrogate "put[s] himself
in the shoes of the incompetent patient and decide[s] as the patient
would if competent." 8 The incompetent patient who has no surro-
gate further complicates the process, therefore, because there exists
no person with sufficient knowledge of the patient to articulate the
patient's treatment preferences. 9
Although many states have enacted DNR statutes to protect the
rights of terminally ill patients, only the New York General Assem-
bly has addressed the problem of the incompetent patient without a
surrogate.' 0 Section 2966 of the statute allows~a physician to issue a
DNR order for an incompetent patient without a surrogate if two
(1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1989); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 672.001 to
.021 (LEXIS 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1989); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp.
1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp.1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-
30-1 to -10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (1989);4WYo. STAT. §§ 33-22-101
to -109 (1988).
5 A surrogate is defined in one statute as a "person selected to make a decision
regarding rescusitation on behalf of another person pursuant to section twenty-nine
hundred sixty-five of this article." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(17) (McKinney Supp.
1990). Section 2965 lists the following persons in descending order: a spouse, son or
daughter, parent, brother or sister, close friend. Id. § 2965(4)(a)(iii-vii) (McKinney
Supp. 1990).
6 See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981). Under the common law doctrine, only the patient may decide to
exercise the right of self-determination. The common law reflects the belief that only
the patient may adequately weigh the probable consequences of treatment. Under the
constitutional right of privacy, see infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text, the right of
self-determination remains with the patient, whether or not conscious. Thus, the com-
mon law right and constitutional right create very different results for the incompetent
patient.
7 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), modified
and remanded, 70 NJ. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976); see infra notes 27-42 and accom-
panying text.
8 Note, In re Conroy: Forging a Path to Death with Dignity, 67 B.U.L. REv. 365, 370
(1987) (footnote omitted) (authored by Andrew Agrawal); see infra notes 60-69 and ac-
companying text.
9 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 126.
10 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2978 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
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physicians concur that "resuscitation would be medically futile."11
This Note contends that section 2966 does not adequately protect
the right of self-determination of the incompetent patient without a
surrogate because the physician issuing the order cannot possibly
evaluate the important, non-medical factors involved in making an
irreversible treatment decision. This Note argues that, when no sur-
rogate exists, a hospital ethics committee together with a guardian
ad litem can better protect the incompetent patient's right by re-
viewing the case prior to the point at which a physician issues a DNR
order.
I
THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The doctrine of informed consent provides the basis for the pa-
tient's right of self-determination.' 2 Under the doctrine, the physi-
cian must inform the patient as to the type of treatment and the risks
involved, then the patient must consent to that particular treat-
ment.' 3 Informed consent thus recognizes the individual's interest
in preserving the "inviolability of his person."14 Self-determination
as derived from informed consent gives each person the right to
control his or her own body, "a basic societal concept long recog-
nized in the common law."' 5 Under self-determination, the individ-
ual weighs the costs and benefits of treatment according to his or
her particular needs and exercises the right by giving or withholding
consent.' 6 Only a patient knows sufficiently the value preferences,
11 Id. § 2966.
12 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMINGJAMES & OSCAR GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.1
(1986).
13 See Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983); see
also Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE LJ. 1632, 1635 (1974) (authored
by Charles H. Montange) (informed consent does not give the physician an unqualified
right to treat the patient in any manner; the patient must consent to any new treatment);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A comment e (1977) (consent is to substantially
the same conduct as described and to any bodily invasion). Cf W. PAGE KEETON & WIL-
LIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 118 (W. Page Keeton 5th
ed. 1984).
14 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739,
370 N.E.2d 417, 422 (1977) (citing Pratt v. Davis, 118 Il1. App. 161, 166 (1905), affid,
224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906)).
15 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("[N]o right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person.. ."); see also Pratt v. Davis,
118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905), afd, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); In re Farrell, 108
NJ. 335, 347, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987); Zimmerman v. New York City Health and
Hosps., 91 A.D.2d 290, 458 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Schloendorff v. New
York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Note, supra note 13.
16 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 12, at 563; see also PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 136.
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capacity for pain and suffering, and religious beliefs necessary to de-
cide what treatment best serves his or her needs.17 The right of self-
determination thus preserves a patient's bodily autonomy.
The Supreme Court has not expressly recognized this right of
self-determination as a federal Constitutional right of privacy. 18
However, the Court has expanded the right of privacy to include
such personal and medical concerns as contraception,19 procrea-
tion,20 and family relationships. 2 1 For example, the Court has held
that a woman may exercise the rights of privacy and self-determina-
tion to decide whether to bring her pregnancy to term.22 Indeed,
the Court has extended this right of self-determination to permit a
woman to terminate her pregnancy without her husband's knowl-
edge or input, despite the interest he may have in the medical
decision. 23
The Supreme Court decisions echo the common law notion
that no right is more sacred than the right of every individual to
17 See 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 12, at 563; Note, supra note 13,
at 61.
18 But see In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1975); Note, supra note 8,
at 368-69 ("The most important aspect of the Quinlan decision was... that an incompe-
tent person's right to refuse treatment flows from the federal constitutional right of pri-
vacy."); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 480, 484 (1965) ("The Bill of Rights
have [sic] penumbras, formed by emanations from those [specific] guarantees that help
give them life and substance.").
The right to refuse medical treatment does not extend to all forms of medical treat-
ment. For example, some courts hold that a person may not refuse blood transfusions,
on religious grounds, when refusal means a loss of life. See, e.g., In re President of Ge-
orgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); see
also Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985
(1984) (authored by Mark Fowler) [hereinafter Note, Appointing an Agent]; Note, Equality
for the Elderly Incompetent. A Proposal for Dignified Death, 39 STAN. L. REV. 689, 700 (1987)
(authored by Tracy L. Merritt) [hereinafter Note, Dignified Death]. But see Estate of
Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (Jehovah's Witness has legal right to
refuse medical treatment).
19 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
21 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The right to decide whether or not to bring
the pregnancy to term may be exercised only in the first trimester without any state
interference. In the second trimester, the state may regulate the medical conditions of
the abortion, following its interest in the mother's welfare. In the third trimester, the
state's parens patriae interest in preserving life becomes compelling and the woman may
no longer decide to terminate her pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
These circumstances differ from the incompetent patient because a treatment re-
fusal case decision does not implicate another life, such as a fetus's life. Thus, the prin-
ciple in Roe, that an individual has a constitutional right to determine private medical
matters, becomes even more compelling in a treatment refusal case.
23 Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (the woman physi-
cally bears the child and is more affected by the pregnancy, so she may decide
unilaterally).
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possess and control himself free from restraint. 24 Although the
Court recently limited the right to privacy in a case dealing with ho-
mosexual sodomy, it noted that privacy in matters dealing with fam-
ily, marriage, or procreation still remained protected under the
Constitution. 25 The Court has thus established two factors which it
uses to determine the existence of a constitutional right of privacy:
(1) whether the decision is personal, involving one's self or family,
and (2) whether the decision greatly affects life and development.
Because the decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment involves
both of these issues, a constitutional right of self-determination has
emerged. 26
A. New Jersey and Massachusetts Establish a Right of Self-
Determination
The celebrated case of Karen Ann Quinlan first established a
constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The New
Jersey Supreme Court relied on the federal constitutional right of
privacy cases to establish a right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment. 27 In Quinlan, twenty-one year old Karen Ann Quinlan,
for unknown reasons, had entered a chronic persistent vegetative
state with no possible hope of recovery. The New Jersey Supreme
24 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) ("A compelled surgical intru-
sion into an individual's body for evidence . .. implicates expectations of privacy and
security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable .... '); Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983) (citing Roe, 4 10 U.S. at
169 ("Central among these protected liberties is an individual's 'freedom of personal
choice in matter of marriage and family life.")); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673
(1977) ("Among the historic liberties . . . was a right to be free from, and to obtain
judicial relief for, unjustified intrusion on personal security.") (footnote omitted); see also
United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 491 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The right to be free of
unwanted physical invasions has been recognized as an integral part of the individual's
constitutional freedoms."); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983)
("[A]n adult who is incurably and terminally ill has a constitutional right of privacy that
encompasses the right to refuse treatment that serves only to prolong the dying pro-
cess."); Note, The Right to Die: An Extension of the Right of to Privacy, 18 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 895, 906 (1985) (authored by Vincent T. Bust).
25 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
The Bowers Court upheld a Georgia state statute making sodomy a criminal offense and
refused to find that homosexual sodomy was a constitutionally protected privacy right.
As the Court stated: "No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on other has been demonstrated." Id at 191; see also
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) ("The cases sometimes characterized as pro-
tecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.") (footnote omitted).
26 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). Accord In re Hamlin,
102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985).
27 In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 23, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (1976).
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Court stated that "[United States] Supreme Court decisions have
recognized that a right of personal privacy exists and that certain
areas of privacy are guaranteed under the Constitution. " 28 The
Quinlan court then held that this right of privacy encompassed a pa-
tient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circum-
stances. 29 The New Jersey court thus guaranteed the terminally ill
patient's right of self-determination to guide the course of his or her
treatment.
In another seminal case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court also recognized a federal constitutional right of privacy which
included the right of self-determination. In Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,30 Massachusetts mental health of-
ficials sought to refuse administering chemotherapy treatment to a
sixty-seven year old mentally retarded man who had contracted leu-
kemia. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the
federal constitutional right of privacy included the patient's right to
prevent "unwanted infringements of bodily integrity."31 The court
found that proper regard for human dignity and self-determination
dictated that the terminally ill patient receive constitutional protec-
tion to refuse medical treatment.3 2
Although the Quinlan and Saikewicz courts determined that the
right of self-determination included the right to refuse medical
treatment, neither court found an absolute right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment.3 3 Both courts listed four countervailing state in-
terests to balance against the individual's right of privacy: (1) the
preservation of life, (2) the protection of innocent third parties, (3)
the prevention of suicide, and (4) the maintenance of the medical
profession's ethical integrity. 34 Treatment-refusal cases primarily
28 Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663; see also Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424
(the constitutional guarantee of privacy "encompasses the right of a patient to preserve
his or her right to privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily integrity in appro-
priate circumstances.").
29 Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
Roe held that a woman had a constitutional right to an abortion without any state con-
straints in the first trimester of her pregnancy. See supra note 22. Presumably these are
the "certain circumstances" to which Quinlan refers.
30 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417.
31 Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424. The court stated: "The constitutional right to
privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and
self-determination .... " Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
32 Id. at 738, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
33 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at
425.
34 These factors follow the reasoning of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973),
which says that the right is subject to some compelling state interests. However, the
courts in Quinlan and Saikewicz did not classify the state interest as compelling, but rather
as "countervailing" or "significant." See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
Neither the Saikewicz nor the Quinlan court required a compelling state interest as re-
1989] 223
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
implicate the state interest in the preservation of life and maintain-
ing the ethical integrity of the medical profession.35
In both of these cases, the courts found that the individual's
privacy interest outweighed the state's interest in preserving the
sanctity of life.36 Because terminally ill patients generally require
highly intrusive measures which can only briefly and painfully main-
tain life,3 7 "the state's interest.., weakens and the individual's right
to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the
prognosis dims." 38 Indeed, some cases have noted that the decision
to refuse medical treatment does not desecrate the value of life;
rather, the failure to allow a competent human being to choose des-
ecrates the value of life.39
The courts have also held that the patient's right of privacy gen-
erally outweighs the interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the
medical profession.40 Physicians do not compromise their ethical
integrity when acceding to patient's decisions because the function
quired in Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compel-
ling state interest'...."); compare In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223
(1985) ("[The right to decline treatment] may yield to countervailing societal interests in
sustaining the person's life"); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 31-32;
Note, Substituted Judgment in Medical Decisionmakingfor Incompetent Persons: In re Storar, 1982
Wis. L. REV. 1173, 1181-83 (authored by Suzanne E. Williams).
35 Note, supra note 34, at 1183.
36 See Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (individual right of privacy increases as
bodily invasion increases, state's interests in preserving life concomitantly decreases);
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 740, 370 N.E.2d at 424-25 ("In a number of cases, no.applicable
state interest, or combination of such interests, was found sufficient to outweigh the
individual's interests"); see also In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 348, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (1987);
In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 349, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
37 Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 ("the bodily invasion is very great-she
requires 24 hour intensive nursing care, antibiotics, the assistance of a respirator, a cath-
eter and a feeding tube"); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 468, 380 N.E.2d 134,
135 (1978) ("Various plastic tubes are usually inserted intravenously to supply medica-
tions . . . directly to the heart."); Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (insertion of a
nasogastric tube extending from the patient's nose through her esophagus to her stom-
ach). Note, The Conflict Continues: Who Decides Treatment Questions for the Terminally-Ill In-
competent Patient?, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 641, 649 (1984) (authored by Karen Michaud
Moran).
38 Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664; see also Note, Dignified Death, supra note 18,
at 721 ("[a patient's] right to refuse treatment outweighs the state's interest in prolong-
ing... life") (footnote omitted).
39 See, e.g., Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (citing Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d
1209).
40 See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426 (the prevailing ethical practice
seems to be to recognize that the dying are more often in need of comfort than treat-
ment); Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665 (we would see "a real distinction between
the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life support
or radical surgery"); Conroy, 98 NJ. at 352-53, 486 A.2d at 1225 ("[I]f the patient's right
to informed consent is to have any meaning at all, it must be accorded respect even
when it conflicts with the advice of the doctor ....").
224 [Vol. 75:218
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of medicine, in addition to healing, is to comfort the dying.41 Some
medical professionals claim that the physician has never had "a cate-
gorical imperative to treat aggressively, or to attempt to prolong
life, no matter what the circumstances." 42 The patient thus does not
compromise medical ethics when exercising the right to refuse
treatment.
B. New York Refuses to Recognize the Constitutional Right of
Self-Determination
Contrary to the courts in New Jersey and Massachusetts, the
New York Court of Appeals expressly declined to reach the question
of a constitutional right of self-determination.43 Although New
York has long recognized the right of a competent adult to refuse
treatment,44 the Court of Appeals in Storar found that the common
law basis for the informed consent doctrine adequately protected
the patient's participation in making treatment decisions.45 In
Storar, the court decided two cases which had been consolidated.
The first case involved an eighty-three-year old Catholic priest who,
although incompetent at the time, "had made it known that under
[certain] circumstances he would want a respirator removed. '46
The Court of Appeals held that "clear and convincing" evidence of
Brother Fox's preference existed; therefore, the hospital could dis-
continue life-sustaining treatment.47
In the second case, the court held that it would not discontinue
treatment for a fifty-two-year old mentally retarded man with can-
cer. The court stated that "John Storar was never competent at any
time in his life. He was always totally incapable of understanding or
making a reasoned decision about medical treatment. '48 Because
the patient could not physically formulate and express his treatment
preference, the court denied his right of self-determination. The
New York court considered the common law principle to be as pro-
41 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 758-59, 370 N.E.2d at 426; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 3, 32, 79 ("[H]ealth care professionals serve patients best by maintaining
a presumption in favor of sustaining life, while recognizing that.., patients are entitled
to forego any treatment ....").
42 Arnold S. Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM.J.L. & MED.
233, 236 (1978).
43 In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
44 Schoendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 105 N.E. 92,93
(1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body .... ).
45 Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (the court noted
that the legislature protected patients' rights because state public health laws require
doctors to obtain informed consent).
46 Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
47 Id. at 378-79, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
48 Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
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tective as the constitutional right,49 yet the case ofJohn Storar dem-
onstrates the failings of the common law doctrine. Under common
law, the patient loses the right of self-determination if incompetent;
it is a personal right that a surrogate cannot exercise on behalf of
the patient without clear evidence of the patient's intent.50 Thus,
only a competent patient may exercise the common law right of self-
determination, becuase the common law demands clear evidence of
the patient's treatment preferences.
C. The Self-Determination Rights of Incompetent Persons
The Storar court relied solely on the common law in refusing to
extend the right of self-determination to incompetent patients.
Under traditional informed consent doctrine, however, the physi-
cian could not administer any treatment to an incompetent pa-
tient;51 a surrogate exercised the incompetent patient's right to
make treatment decisions, but only if the surrogate had clear evi-
dence of the patient's preference. 52 The Storar holding thus vitally
affe&ed the traditional rights of incompetent patients by not al-
lowing a surrogate to exercise the incompetent patient's right of
self-determination.
Some courts and commentators have questioned whether in-
competent patients lose their right of self-determination upon los-
ing capacity because the principles of bodily autonomy dictate that
the incompetent patient maintain a right to decide treatment. In
addition, in treatment-refusal cases, the courts which have estab-
lished a constitutional right of self-determination have also ex-
tended the right to incompetent persons. 53
The Quinlan court granted the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment to incompetent persons because the decision was such "a
valuable incident of her right of privacy, [that] it should not be dis-
49 Id. at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270 ("Neither do we reach that
question [of the right of privacy] in this case because the relief granted to the petitioner
... is adequately supported by common-law principles.").
50 Note, In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV.
1087, 1097 (1982) (authored by Carol Ann Colabrese).
51 Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266; see also Relman, supra
note 42, at 236 ("[t]he traditional responsibilities of the physician demand that he make
judgments to treat, or not to treat, which in effect will determine whether, and for how
long, and in what condition, the patient is likely to live or die.").
52 See In reJobes, 108 NJ. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
53 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976) ("[W]e have concluded
that Karen's right of privacy may be asserted on her behalf .... "); see also Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 747, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428
(1977) ("The trend in the law has been to give incompetent persons the same rights as
other individuals"); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978);
Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 529 A.2d 434; In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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carded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious
exercise of the choice." 54 The Saikewicz court also found that the
right extended to the incompetent patient as well as the competent
patient "because the value of human dignity extends to both." 55
Subsequent cases have routinely granted the right of self-determina-
tion to incompetent patients.5 6 This right of self-determination for
incompetent patients recognizes the individualistic ethos present in
our history:
The notion that a person is an autonomous being with inher-
ent dignity and value and whose life and actions are-to the great-
est extent compatible with the rights of others-to be controlled
by his own choices, has been a dominant theme in the philosophy
and politics of Western Civilization. . .. 157
In declining to find a constitutional right of privacy, the Storar
court expressly limited its holding to the facts of the case and noted
that the legislature was better equipped to decide the relevant crite-
ria for decisions to refuse treatment.58 The New York General As-
sembly then extended the right to incompetent patients by adopting
"Orders Not to Resuscitate." 59 The Storar holding remains impor-
tant, however, because it means that incompetent patients are af-
forded no constitutional protection; their only source of right lies
within the statutory provisions. If the statute does not permit ade-
quate exercise of the right through substituted judgment, then in-
competent patients have no recourse to constitutional law. Because
of this lack of constitutional protection, incompetent patients, spe-
54 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
55 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427 ("The recognition of that right
must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient."); see also In
re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 124, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (1983) ("An incompetent's right to
refuse treatment should be equal to a competent's right to do so."); Note, supra note 37,
at 652; Note, supra note 34, at 1187.
56 See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980) ("[T]he
same right [of self-determination] is also extended to an incompetent person .... );
Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); Peter, 108 N.J. at 372, 529 A.2d
at 423 ("all patients, competent or incompetent, with some limited cognitive ability or
[terminally ill] ... are entitled to choose whether or not they want life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment"); Conroy, 98 NJ. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229 ("We hold that life-sustaining
treatment may be withdrawn from an incompetent patient .... ).
57 Note, Decisionmaking for the Incompetent Terminally Ill Patient. A Compromise in a Solu-
tion Eliminates a Compromise of Patients' Rights, 57 IND. LJ. 325, 333 (1987) (authored by
Caroline Anne Knezevich).
58 In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274
(1981).
59 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2978 (McKinney Supp. 1990); infra notes
138-49 and accompanying text. For commentary, see, e.g., PETER I. RIGA, RIGHT To DIE
OR RIGHT To LIVE: LEGAL ASPECTS OF DYING AND DEATH (1981); Note, Dignified Death,
supra, note 18; Note, supra note 37; Note, supra note 50.
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cifically those without a surrogate, need greater protection under
this statute.
II
HOW TO EXERCISE THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT'S RIGHT
The courts have developed two different methods by which a
surrogate may exercise a patient's right of self-determination.
Under the substituted judgment method, the surrogate draws from
his or her personal knowledge of the patient's experiences or pref-
erences to reach a decision that would most closely accord with the
patient's wishes. Under the best interests method, the surrogate ap-
plies a more objective test to determine which treatment decision
would be in the patient's best interests. Although each method has
certain strengths and weaknesses, generally courts choose to apply
the substituted judgment standard.
A. The Substituted Judgment Standard
The court in Quinlan was the first to allow a surrogate 60 to exer-
cise the right of self-determination for an incompetent patient. 6'
The New Jersey court noted that "[o]ur affirmation of Karen's in-
dependent right of choice .. . would ordinarily be based upon her
competency to assert it. The sad truth, however, is that she is
grossly incompetent and we cannot discern her supposed choice
based on the testimony of her previous conversations with
friends." 62
To prevent destruction of Karen's fundamental right to refuse
treatment, the court held that Karen's guardian and family would
determine whether she would have chosen to refuse treatment given
the circumstances. 63 The surrogate's decision then became Karen's
course of treatment. This holding thus gave rise to the "substituted
judgment standard," by which the patient's surrogate must "substi-
60 The surrogate is usually a family member. The President's Commission identi-
fied the family member as the preferable surrogate, because the family generally is most
concerned about the patient, most knowledgeable about the patient's goals and prefer-
ences, and is generally recognized as an important social unit. See PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION, supra note 3, at 18, 128-29.
61 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); see supra notes 27-42 and accom-
panying text.
62 Id.
63 Evidence of the strong moral and religious character of Karen's father led the
Quinlan court to determine that the family was the proper surrogate. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at
38, 355 A.2d at 662 ("Here a loving parent, qua parent ... rais[es] the rights of his
incompetent and profoundly damaged daughter .... ); see also Note, supra note 37, at
655 (treatment is painful and briefly extends life "through great sacrifice and bodily
invasion").
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tute its judgment as nearly as possible for [the patient's]." '
The court in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz
accepted the substituted judgment standard because of its straight-
forward respect for the integrity and autonomy of the individual.
65
The court stated that the primary goal in treating terminally ill, in-
competent patients was to determine with as much accuracy as pos-
sible the individual's wants and needs. 66 From this principle, the
court found that substituted judgment duplicated the patient's
desires.
In contrast, the court in Storar rejected the substituted judg-
ment standard as an unrealistic attempt to determine whether the
terminally ill, incompetent patient would want to discontinue treat-
ment.67 The Storar court held that the mentally retarded Storar had
never been competent and thus could not make a reasoned decision
about treatment.68 According to the Storar court, therefore, the pa-
tient alone could decide whether to refuse treatment, and once the
patient became incompetent, the right to refuse treatment was
lost.69 The Storar decision thus denied the rights of any incompe-
tent patient who did not have the forethought, or was unable, to
make an explicit statement of his or her treatment preferences.
B. The Best Interests Standard
In Conroy, the NewJersey Supreme Court, faced with the case of
an elderly patient who remained conscious yet lacked the mental
and motor ability to let her wishes be known, attempted to articulate
an alternative to the substituted judgment standard.70 The Conroy
court held first that Mrs. Conroy retained her right to refuse treat-
ment although she was "incompetent." In a very detailed opinion,
the court stated that, in applying substituted judgment, the patient's
surrogate must "seek to respect simultaneously both aspects of the
patient's right to self-determination-the right to live, and the right
... to die .... "71
The Conroy court next stated that, "[i]n the absence of adequate
64 Note, supra note 34, at 1190.
65 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 748,
370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977); see id. at 753, 370 N.E.2d at 428 ("To protect the incompe-
tent person within its power, the State must recognize the dignity and worth of such a
person and afford to that person that same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in
competent persons.").
66 Id. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
67 In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274
(1981). See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
68 Id. at 378,420 N.E.2d at 72,438 N.Y.S.2d at 274; see Note, supra note 34, at 1181.
69 Id. at 378, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
70 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-68, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (1985).
71 Id. at 356, 486 A.2d at 1227.
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proof of the patient's wishes, it is naive to pretend that the right to
self-determination serves as the basis for substituted decision-mak-
ing."7 2 The Conroy court then developed two standards for deter-
mining when to withdraw treatment in cases of inadequate proof.
Under the "limited-objective" test, the surrogate weighs (1) any evi-
dence of the patient's intent to refuse treatment and (2) whether the
burdens of treatment outweigh its benefits.73 In the absence of any
proof of intent, the Conroy court developed the "pure-objective"
test, in which the surrogate (1) weighs the benefits and burdens of
treatment and (2) determines that treatment would cause the patient
an inordinate amount of pain. 74 Although the court emphasized
that the "primary focus [for making treatment decisions] should be
the patient's desires," 75 it nonetheless proposed objective tests
based largely on the medical prognosis.
C. Rejection of the Best Interests Standard and a Return to
the Substituted Judgment Standard
Despite commentators' approval, the courts have not adopted
the objective "best interests" test.7 6 Indeed, the New Jersey
Supreme Court later questioned the validity of the Conroy test for
making treatment decisions, noting that it is very difficult, if not im-
possible, to measure either the burdens of pain, rage, or frustration,
or the benefits ofjoy or satisfaction that an incompetent patient may
feel.77 In Peter, the court found that medical choices are private and
cannot be decided by societal standards of reasonableness or nor-
malcy. 78 The court stated:
While a benefits-burdens analysis is difficult with marginally
cognitive patients like Claire Conroy, it is essentially impossible
with patients in a persistent vegetative state. By definition such
patients, like Ms. Peter, do not experience any of the benefits or
burdens that the Conroy balancing tests are intended or able to
appraise. Therefore, we hold that these tests should not be ap-
72 Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231.
73 Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
74 Id., 486 A.2d at 1232.
75 Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233.
76 See Note, Natural Death: An Alternative in New Jersey, 73 GEO. LJ. 1331, 1334
(1985) (authored by Suzanne Levant) ("[T]he Conroy pure objective test, modified so as
not to consider pain the determinative factor, should be applied to all situations involv-
ing a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment ...."); see also Note,
supra note 8, at 381 ("Conroy's rejection of substituted judgment as the sole means for
effectuating an incompetent's right to refuse medical treatment is appropriate .... );
Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Terminally Ill Incompetent,
4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367 (1979).
77 See In reJobes, 108 NJ. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 NJ. 365, 529
A.2d 419 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
78 Peter, 108 NJ. at 373, 529 A.2d at 423.
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plied to patients in the persistent vegetative state.79
InJobes, the court stated that when an incompetent's wishes are
not clearly expressed, a surrogate decision maker must consider the
patient's personal value system for guidance, looking to philosophi-
cal, theological and ethical values.80 These cases demonstrate the
New Jersey Supreme Court's rejection of the Conroy standards and
its return to the substituted judgment standard for all terminally ill,
incompetent patients.
The best interests method cannot reasonably serve to exercise
the incompetent patient's right of self-determination. By relying on
social norms, the best interests method fails to recognize "every-
one's right to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for [the
patient] are intolerable consequences or risks, however warped or
perverted his sense of values may be .. ,,s8 The substituted judg-
ment standard, therefore, remains the viable standard.
Critics of the substituted judgment standard question whether
one can feasibly decide to withdraw treatment simply on the basis of
patient-centered substantive criteria.8 2 They contend that no surro-
gate can properly ascertain what the patient would want, and that
the fiction of substituted judgment serves only to confuse and not
clarify the decisionmaking process.8 3 These critics argue that,
although the substituted judgment standard is on its face a subjec-
tive one, in reality the surrogate uses objective criteria to evaluate
what would be in the patient's best interests.8 4 They maintain that
the objective standard is the only feasible one, that the courts
should clearly articulate it, and that the medical profession should
apply it.85
At least one commentator believes that only the physician can
79 Id. at 376-77, 529 A.2d at 425.
80 Jobes, 108 NJ. at 413-15, 529 A.2d at 444.
81 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (1968 Supp.); see
also Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (each man is considered the master
of his own body), reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
82 See, e.g., P. RIGA, supra note 59, at 171; Relman, supra note 42, at 237; Note,
Dignified Death, supra note 18, at 714.
83 Note, Dignified Death, supra note 18, at 714 ("the decisionmaker is very seldom
able to ascertain the incompetent's desires with any certainty"); PAUL S. APPELBAUM,
CHARLES LIDZ & ALAN MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENr: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRAC-
TICE 97 (1987) (the ideal of substituted judgment "is far more easily stated than
achieved, if only because many people cannot say with much precision how they them-
selves would act in the future").
84 P. APPLEBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 83, at 97; see also J.P. Swazey,
Treatment and Nontreatment Decisions: In Whose Best Interests?, in DILEMMAS OF DYING 96
(1981) ("In exercising substituted judgment, stewards by admittedly complex feats of
mental gymnastics, try to reason what incompetent patients would deem to be in their
own best interests.").
85 See Note, Dignified Death, supra note 18, at 714.
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adequately protect the patient's rights because patients cannot com-
prehend fully the technical medical issues. 86 Thus, the physician
carries the primary responsibility to decide treatment. Again, this
critic argues that the courts should recognize the reality of how a
DNR order comes about and abandon the farce of determining
whether the patient would exercise the right to refuse treatment.
Despite these criticisms, many cases have adopted some form of
the substituted judgment standard when issuing DNR orders for in-
competent patients. 87 Substituted judgment, commentators con-
tend, is the only method by which a surrogate can fully exercise the
incompetent patient's right of self-determination.8 8 Thus, any pro-
cedure for implementing a right of self-determination, like the New
York statute, should fully and adequately uphold the substituted
judgment standard.
III
SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT FOR INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
WITHOUT SURROGATES
A. Judicial Involvement in Substituted Judgment
Although cases such as Quinlan and Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz emphasized the importance of the substituted
judgment standard, neither case specifically addressed the question
of the incompetent patient who has no family or designated surro-
gate. 89 The Supreme Court of Washington, however, has expressly
addressed the issue of the rights of an incompetent patient without a
surrogate.90 The Washington court has determined that the judici-
ary should intervene to protect the rights of the terminally ill, in-
competent patient by applying the substituted judgment standard
with the aid of a guardian ad litem.
86 See, e.g., Relman, supra note 42, at 237.
87 See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 493 (1983) (the court noted that any surrogate decisionmaker ought to be guided
by his or her knowledge of the patient's personal feelings or desires); In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 380 N.E.2d
134 (1978); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (utilizes subjective, limited-
objective and objective tests for substitutedjudgment); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810,
689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
88 See Note, A Structural Analysis of the Physician-Patient Relationship in No-Code Decision-
making, 93 YALE LJ. 362, 375 (1983) (authored by Dean M. Hashimoto) ("[g]eneralized,
objective tests cannot satisfactorily approximate the subjective wishes of individual pa-
tients .. "); Note, supra note 37, at 674 ("[t]he patient's character and personality, prior
statements, and general attitude towards medical treatment must be considered by the
guardian when making the substituted judgment for the patient"); Note, supra note 34,
at 1190.
89 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
90 Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660
P.2d 738 (1983).
232 [Vol. 75:218
NOTE-SELF-DETERMINATION
In Colyer, the court affirmed a constitutional right of self-deter-
mination for decisions to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 91 The
Colyer court also affirmed the Quinlan holding that even an incompe-
tent patient maintained the right of self-determination which a sur-
rogate would exercise through the substituted judgment standard.
Under Washington statutory law, 92 in cases involving incompetent
patients, a court must appoint a guardian ad litem to serve as surro-
gate and "use his best judgment in deciding whether or not to assert
the personal right of the incompetent to refuse life-sustaining
treatment." 93
The Colyer court determined that, in the case of an incompetent
patient with a family member to serve as guardian, the court need
not participate in the substantive decision to withhold treatment.94
The court perceived the judicial process to be too cumbersome and
unresponsive to adequately exercise a patient's right of self-determi-
nation. 95 In the case of an incompetent patient without a family
member or designated surrogate, the Colyer court set up the follow-
ing procedure:
If a court determination is required, a guardian ad litem must
be appointed to ascertain and protect the interests of the patient.
At such a proceeding, the focus would be a determination of the
rights and wishes of the incompetent.... On the basis of infor-
mation presented to it, the court would determine, in its best
judgment, whether the facts demonstrated that the incompetent
would have chosen to exercise his or her right to refuse treatment,
if he or she were able to do so. 9 6
The court thus determined that the judiciary should apply the sub-
stituted judgment standard and make the substantive decision re-
garding treatment.
The Washington Supreme Court later recanted this analysis in
a case involving an incompetent patient without a surrogate.97 The
court held that, since it would always participate in the appointment
of the guardian, the court need not take part in the substantive deci-
sion to terminate treatment.98 Although the court also emphasized
"that these decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis with par-
91 Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 132, 660 P.2d 738, 747.
92 See WASH. REv. CODE 11.92.040(3) (1979).
93 Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 131, 660 P.2d at 747.
94 Id. at 127, 660 P.2d at 742.
95 Id. at 130-31, 660 P.2d at 746 (the court noted that the patients often died long
before the case came before the court); see In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115
(1980); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
96 Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 136-37, 660 P.2d at 750-51.
97 In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
98 Id. at 820, 689 P.2d at 1378.
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ticularized consideration of the best interests and rights of the spe-
cific individual,"9 9 the court feared that burdensome judicial
intervention could thwart the exercise of the incompetent patient's
right of self-determination.
B. A Procedural Method to Exercise Substituted Judgment
Three different methods have been proposed and implemented
in an attempt to fully and adequately exercise the incompetent pa-
tient's self-determination right in the absence of a surrogate. The
Quinlan court proposed the first method, by which a hospital's medi-
cal staff, through a hospital ethics committee, could properly organ-
ize the decisionmaking process.100 The Saikewicz court, on the other
hand, chose to require judicial intervention in which a substantive
decision to withhold treatment is made. 101 Commentators have
suggested a third method which simply leaves the decision to the
physician, since the phygician presumably understands most fully
the patient's medical situation. 10 2
Because no third party exists to protect the patient's rights, the
incompetent patient's right of self-determination depends on the
method chosen to implement the right. If the physician alone de-
cides, the chances increase greatly that the patient's treatment will
follow the medical prognosis regardless of the patient's personal
considerations. If a guardian ad litem or other party represents
solely the patient's non-medical interests, then the decision will
more closely follow the substituted judgment standard.103
99 Id. at 815, 689 P.2d at 1375. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.010 (1986), the
guardian has the duty to act in the best interests of the ward and to assert the ward's
rights. This duty itself provides a safeguard for the rights of incompetent patients. In
addition, under WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122 (1979), the attending physician must consult
with a prognosis committee before issuing a DNR order, ensuring complete review of
the medical diagnosis. On the basis of these procedural safeguards, Hamlin permitted
life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn from an incompetent patient without a surro-
gate. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 822-23, 689 P.2d at 1379.
100 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1976) ("[I]t would be more
appropriate to provide a regular forum for more input and dialogue in individual
situations....").
101 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759,
370 N.E.2d 417, 434-35 (1977) ("[Siuch questions of life and death seem to us to re-
quire the process of detached but passionate investigation . . . on which the judicial
branch was created.").
102 See Relman, supra note 42, at 237 ("The essence of the relation between doctor
and patient is trust. The patient trusts that his physician will do the best thing possible for
him under the circumstances, using a reasonable degree of professional skill ....
(emphasis in original).
103 Most courts have recognized that the patient without a surrogate deserves special
attention. See, e.g., In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 109 N.J.
365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 355, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Hamlin,
102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738
(1983).
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1. The Hospital Ethics Committee
The Quinlan court found that, in regular treatment situations, a
hospital ethics committee composed of physicians, lawyers, theolo-
gians and/or other non-medical professionals could aid in making
treatment decisions.' 0 4 Because the patient in that case had a surro-
gate, the court directed the hospital ethics committee to only review
the possibility of "Karen's ever emerging to a cognitive, sapient
state."'10 5 The actual decision to terminate treatment was given to
the surrogate. As an underlying principle, however, the court stated
that decisions to refuse life-sustaining treatment must "be respon-
sive not only to the concepts of medicine but also the common
moral judgment of the community at large."' 0 6 The court sug-
gested that the medical prognosis alone cannot bring all important
factors under consideration. Although the court did not address the
problem of an incompetent patient without a surrogate, presumably
it would follow the ethics committee procedure.
Other courts have criticized the Quinlan procedure of establish-
ing an innerhospital committee to deal with such cases. The Colyer
court, for example, found the committee to be ineffectual "for its
amorphous character, for its use of nonmedical personnel to reach a
medical decision, and for its bureaucratic intermeddling."' 0 7 One
commentator suggested that the hospital ethics committee is actu-
ally nothing more than a prognosis committee because that is the
only issue on which it renders an opinion. l08 Despite these criti-
cisms, the committee remains a valuable method for implementing a
patient's rights.
2. Judicial Involvement
Contrary to the Quinlan court, Saikewicz required that the judici-
ary review all decisions regarding the substituted judgment standard
for incompetent patients. 10 9 The Saikewicz court reasoned that
choices of a personal nature for incompetent persons involve irre-
versible medical decisions and, as such, warrant close scrutiny by
104 Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 ("Ethics Committee[s] ... serve[ ] to
review the individual circumstances of ethical dilemma .... ) (citing Karen Teel, The
Physician's Dilemma-A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9
(1975)).
105 Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
106 Id. at 44, 355 A.2d at 665.
107 Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 132, 660 P.2d at 749; see also P. RiGA, supra note 59, at 172-
73.
108 See Annas, supra note 76, at 379.
109 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 755-
59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432-35 (1977).
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society, its legislature and its courts. 110 The court required the
guardian ad litem to present to the judge all reasonable arguments
to "ensure that all viewpoints and alternatives [for the patient] will
be aggressively pursued and examined at the subsequent hearing
where it will be determined whether or not treatment should or
should not be allowed." ''  Thus, the Saikewicz court envisioned a
much more active role for the judiciary.
In subsequent cases, courts have struggled with the Saikewicz
court's effort to increase the measure of court involvement in the
treatment decision making process.1 2 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Spring later explained that actions taken without judicial
approval were not per se illegal or subject to legal consequences," 13
yet also stated that "when a court is properly presented with the
legal question, whether treatment may be withheld, it must decide
that question .... "114 Thus, the Spring court gave no guidance as to
exactly when the court should be involved.
Commentators have sharply criticized the Saikewicz procedure
of judicial involvement both for "the problems that result from
court intervention such as the extra emotional and financial bur-
den" on the family' 15 and "the large potential case load, which leads
to delay." ' 1 6 For these reasons, other courts have shied away from
excessive judicial involvement by entrusting the decisionmaking to a
qualified, court-appointed guardian ad litem. 117
C. The Physician as Sole Decisionmaker
Ideally, the physician and the patient together would evaluate
both the medical and the personal concerns of the patient and de-
cide whether to terminate the patient's life-sustaining treatment. 118
Some commentators urge that, if the patient lacks the capacity to
decide, the physician should make treatment decisions because the
physician alone can assess the patient's medical situation.I19
'10 See Note, supra note 34, at 1190.
"'1 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 756, 370 N.E.2d at 433.
112 See In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629,405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984).
113 Spring, 380 Mass. at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 119.
114 Id., 405 N.E.2d at 119. The court noted that no binding precedent existed on
the question of the incompetent patient without a surrogate.
115 Note, supra note 50, at 1092.
116 Note, supra note 57, at 343.
117 See, e.g., In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
118 See P. RIGA, supra note 59, at 103.
119 See, e.g., Relman, supra note 42, at 236-37, 241-42; cf John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984) (stating that "[d]octors, in
consultation with close family members are in the best position to make these deci-
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The medical profession contends that judicial encroachment on
the physician's traditional role hinders the physician's ability to per-
form his duties.' 20 They aver that, as trained professionals, they
have the background, experience and psyche to make difficult medi-
cal decisions. 12' These commentators recognize that the desires of
the patient must be respected, but they believe that only the physi-
cian can realistically interpret a patient's desires in light of the medi-
cal prognosis. These commentators further urge that the physician
should determine a patient's status without the constraints of judi-
cial intervention or committee review.
The physician alone, however, cannot exercise the right of self-
determination. As medical technology allows physicians to delay
death, profound questions about values arise that are not answer-
able on the basis of professional expertise alone.' 22 The physician
cannot adequately protect the patient's rights, because each patient
attaches a different value to the possible benefits and costs involved
in the medical decision.' 23 As one commentator noted:
[T]he doctor's lack of impartiality may rise to the level of con-
scious consideration of criteria which he believes should be rele-
vant even though society might not be willing to tolerate their use
as criteria-for example, the patient's intelligence, personality, or
social or economic status, or the expense of maintaining the patient.' 24
If the physician alone determines a patient's status, the physician
may thus impose his or her own values in a manner "both inconsis-
tent with patient preferences and unjustified by technical
expertise."125
Indeed, physicians can pose a significant threat to patient self-
determination because the physician may rely on his or her tradi-
tional expertise and preempt patient authority.' 26 The possibility of
medical malpractice litigation or even criminal sanctions could
greatly affect a physician's judgment in a treatment situation.' 27
sions," rejecting the Quinlan ethics committee and the judicial appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem, and noting that physicians should be held only to a good faith standard).
120 Note, supra note 1, at 516 n.4 & 518.
121 See Roe, Treatment Decisions and Triage: The Physician's Burden, in DILEMMAS OF DY-
ING 91 (C. WONG &J. SWAZEY ed. 1981); Note, supra note 50, at 1105 ("Physicians make
life and death decisions as a part of their everyday job and it is their duty to keep the
best interests of the patient at heart.").
122 See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 15-41.
123 See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE LJ. 219, 220, 292-93 (1985); see also Note, supra note 88, at 379.
124 Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 AM. J.L.
MED. 340, 350 (1979) (emphasis added).
125 Note, supra note 88, at 369.
126 See Shultz, supra note 123, at 272 ("[Tlhere is a significant danger that decisions
will reflect the doctor's attitudes and values rather than the patient's.").
127 In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 46, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (1976).
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Some studies reveal that physicians listed poor prognosis, not pa-
tient or family wishes, as the reason for issuing an order not to re-
suscitate.128 In some instances, physicians did not even consult with
competent patients, but unilaterally issued treatment orders, 129 thus
contravening the goal of patient self-determination. 130
The leading cases on life-sustaining treatment agree that the
physician should not be the sole decisionmaker.' 3 1 The Quinlan
court stated that it would hesitate greatly to immunize physicians
from liability when physicians unilaterally make treatment deci-
sions.' 32 The Quinlan ethics committee divided the responsibility
for the decision, noting that "[re]any physicians, in many circum-
stances, would welcome this sharing of responsibility."' 133 The
court in Saikewicz also expressed grave doubts as to the ability of
physicians to make such decisions: 134 "[S]uch questions of life and
death seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate
investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial
branch of government was created."' 135 None of these decisions
held that the physician alone should make the decision to refuse
treatment. In light of some medical professional reluctance to dis-
cuss life-sustaining treatment with patients and the intensely per-
sonal nature of the privacy right involved, 136 the state should use all
means necessary to emphasize and protect patient self-determina-
tion. Because the physician alone cannot fully protect the patient's
rights, the patient or the surrogate should make the ultimate
decision. 137
128 Susanna E. Bedell, Denise Pelle, Patricia L. Maher & Paul D. Cleary, Do-Not-Re-
suscitate Orders for Critically Ill Patients in the Hospital, 256J. A.M.A., July 11, 1986, at 233;
Andrew L. Evans & Baruch A. Brody, The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order in Teaching Hospitals,
253 J. A.M.A., Apr. 19, 1985, at 2236.
129 Evans & Brody, supra note 128, at 2237.
130 See id.
131 See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
355 A.2d 647; In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
132 Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 48, 355 A.2d at 668 ("We would hesitate, in this imperfect
world, to propose as to physicians that type of immunity which from the early common
law has surrounded judges. .. ").
133 Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 669.
134 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
135 Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
136 See Note, supra note 88, at 379-82.
137 See id. at 371-72.
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IV
NEW YORK'S "Do NOT RESUSCITATE" STATUTE
A. Introduction
On August 7, 1987, New York enacted a statute entitled "Or-
ders Not To Resuscitate."'13 8 The statutory goal is to allow physi-
cians to withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation in certain
treatment situations "where appropriate consent has been ob-
tained."'13 9 Section 2960 of the statute states that the legislative in-
tent was "to clarify and establish the rights and obligations of
patients, their families, and health care providers" regarding orders
not to resuscitate. 140
The New York State Task Force on Life and Law drafted the Do
Not Resuscitate statute substantially adopted by the legislature.' 4 '
The General Assembly incorporated the substituted judgment stan-
dard in the statute, 142 noting that the surrogate must rely on the
"patient's values and interests" when making treatment deci-
sions. 143 The statute further states that the surrogate should decide
for or against resuscitation based on the patient's wishes, "including
a consideration of the patient's religious and moral beliefs." 144 This
goal of self-determination accords fully with prior New York statu-
tory law, 145 as well as with New York decisional law on informed
consent. 146 Thus, before anyone could make a treatment-refusal de-
cision under the New York statute, he or she must consider the pa-
tient's personal wishes, regardless of whether the patient is
incompetent.
The statute expressly adopts the substituted judgment standard
for surrogates, yet it blatantly abandons this substituted judgment
standard when dealing with incompetent patients without a surro-
gate. Under the statute, the physician, and only the physician, has
the authority to control these patients' treatment. Section 2966 dis-
cusses decision making for incompetent patients without a surrogate:
138 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960-2978 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
139 Id § 2960.
140 Id.
141 See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, Do NOT RESUSCITATE
ORDERS: THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE
ON LIFE AND THE LAW (1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
142 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
143 TASK FORCE, supra note 141, at 36.
144 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
'45 Id. §§ 2504, 2805-d (McKinney 1985).
146 See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266,
274 (1981) (state law supports the right of the competent adult to make his own deci-
sion); Zimmerman v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 91 A.D.2d 290, 458
N.Y.S.2d 552 (New York App. Div. 1983); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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1. If no surrogate is reasonably available, willing to make a
decision regarding issuance of an order not to resuscitate, and
competent to make a decision regarding issuance of an order not
to resuscitate on behalf of an adult patient who lacks capacity and
who had not previously expressed a decision regarding cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, an attending physician (a) may issue an
order not to resuscitate the patient, provided that the attending
physician determines, in writing, that, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, resuscitation would be medically futile, and
another physician. . . concurs in writing with such determination
147
In effect, a physician may unilaterally issue an order not to treat
an incompetent patient during cardiac arrest. The statute outlines
the possible situations in which a physician may issue a DNR order
for an incompetent patient. The patient need not be unconscious; if
the physician determines that the patient may not understand the
consequences of the order, then the physician may designate the
patient as incompetent. 148 More importantly, the physician is
placed under no duty to attempt to ascertain the patient's wishes.
The physician need only determine to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty that resuscitation is medically futile before issuing an
order that meets the statute's provisions.1 49
B. The Statute Fails to Promote Either Self-Determination or
Substituted Judgment
The goal of the statute was to enact a procedure for issuing
DNR orders that was consistent with the principle of patient self-
determination. 150 Section 2966, however, contravenes this policy.
The statute provides few procedural safeguards for protecting the
rights of an incompetent patient without a surrogate. It protects the
incompetent patient without a surrogate only to the extent that an-
other physician must concur in the medical prognosis. The physi-
cian need not take any affirmative steps beyond a purely medical
147 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2966 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
148 The statute defines cardiopulmonary resuscitation as any means necessary to re-
store cardiac function or to support ventilation should cardiac arrest occur. Id.
§ 2961(4). "'Capacity' means the ability to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of [the order] and to reach an informed decision," id. § 2961(3), and,
although the physician may determine that the patient lacks capacity to decide to issue a
DNR order, the physician may still consider the patient competent to make other deci-
sions. "Medically futile" means that the patient is likely to have more cardiac arrests and
will die in a short period of time or it means that the patient will die despite the at-
tempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Id. § 2961(9).
149 Id § 2966(l)(a). A reasonable degree of medical certainty most likely follows the
traditional requirement that a physician employ the skill and knowledge of the profes-
sion as a whole. KEETON & PROSSER, supra note 13, at 185.
150 TASK FORCE, supra note 141, at 7-8.
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diagnosis, and need not consider any important non-medical con-
cerns. Section 2966 thus entirely fails to promote either statutory
goal: self-determination or the substituted judgment standard.
The New York statute further fails to promote the substituted
judgment standard because it does not designate a surrogate for the
incompetent patient who lacks one. 5 1 As such, section 2966 fails to
follow the standards of substituted judgment adopted elsewhere in
the statute. 152 No one has responsibility for protecting the incom-
petent patient's rights. Although courts have required judicial ap-
pointment of a guardian for every incompetent patient without a
surrogate, 153 the New York statute fails to use the guardian ad litem
or any other safeguard to protect the incompetent patient's right of
self-determination. Furthermore, the physician cannot be held re-
sponsible for protecting the patient's rights or liable for a breach of
those rights, because he or she is responsible solely for the medical
prognosis.
This departure from the substituted judgment standard for the
incompetent patient without a surrogate has no support from com-
mentators or existing case law. As many courts have noted,154 deci-
sionmakers for incompetent patients should concern themselves
primarily with protecting the patient's right of self-determination.
These courts have enacted procedural safeguards to protect the in-
competent patient's rights. In Quinlan, the court recommended the
use of hospital ethics committees "to provide a regular forum for
more input and dialogue in individual situations."' 155 The ethics
committee serves to address the individual's non-medical concerns
or preferences, thus protecting patients' rights. The holdings in
Farrell, Peter, andJobes demonstrate the New Jersey Supreme Court's
conviction that a non-medical committee or group must review the
decision to ensure full protection of the patient's rights.
The Saikewicz court required judicial intervention whenever a
physician desired to withdraw treatment from an incompetent pa-
tient. The Massachusetts court further clarified its holding in
Spring,156 stating that the judiciary protected the patient's rights by
151 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2966 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
152 See id. § 2965(5)(a).
153 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
660 P.2d 738 (1983).
154 See In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re
Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d
1372 (1984); Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738.
155 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668.
156 In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
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appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the patient's wishes. l5 7
The Washington court in Hamlin'58 and Colyer'59 followed this rea-
soning in holding that the judiciary must appoint a guardian ad li-
tem. The court stated that, since "the court will always be involved
in the appointment of the guardian,"' 160 the patient's rights would
be adequately protected.
Safeguards to protect patients' rights become even more im-
portant when a statute allows physicians to issue a DNR order for
cardiac arrest. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation, unlike life support
systems for vegetative patients, represents life-sustaining treatment
which can restore the patient to a functional, cognitive state. 161 One
study notes that patients who survive cardiopulmonary resuscitation
tend to have only one major residual disability-confinement in the
home. 162 The study stated, however, that these patients were lim-
ited mainly by fear rather than by a change in physical capabili-
ties. 163 An improper decision to issue a DNR order for cardiac
arrest is even more egregious than in the case of the vegetative indi-
vidual, becuase it could deprive a patient of a "normal life."
The statistics about cardiopulmonary resuscitation show that
physicians cannot easily determine whether cardiopulmonary resus-
citation will be unsuccessful.' 64 The Task Force found that from
three to thirty percent of resuscitated patients survive and are even-
tually discharged from the hospital. 165 The survival rate of cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation changes greatly depending on the personal
characteristics of the patient.166 Although doctors attempt "to pres-
ent a face of decisiveness to patients, they are often only sure about
their own uncertainty."'' 67 Physicians may be unwilling to discuss a
patient's status if they feel unable to predict accurately the extent of
the patient's illness and chances for survival.168 In some cases, phy-
sicians have issued orders not to resuscitate for some patients that
157 Id. at 638, 405 N.E.2d at 121 ("There is responsible opinion ... that a duly
appointed guardian of the person may give effective consent for the ward.").
158 In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
159 In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
160 Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 820, 689 P.2d at 1378.
161 Susanna E. Bedell, Thomas L. Delbanco, E. Francis Cook & Franklin H. Epstein,
Survival After Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the Hospital, 309 NEw ENG.J. MED. 569 (Sept.
8, 1983).
162 See id. at 575.
163 Id.
164 See Bedell, Pelle, Maher & Cleary, supra note 128.
165 TASK FORCE, supra note 141, at 4.
166 Id.; see also Bedell, Delbanco, Cook & Epstein, supra note 161, at 574-75.
167 Shultz, supra note 123, at 270.
168 See Brennan, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders for the Incompetent Patient in the Absence of Fam-
ily Consent, 14 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 13, 16 (1986).
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did not need such designation; 169 these physicians evidently deter-
mined that "resuscitation [would] serve no useful purpose" and is-
sued an order on that basis.170
This attitude contravenes both the New York statute's intent
and social policy, since the physician totally abrogates the patient's
right to self-determination. A patient may be deprived of bodily in-
tegrity if a physician makes a purely medical, non-reviewable and
possibly incorrect decision. Thus, the patient's right of self-deter-
mination should be adequately protected under state statutory law,
yet the New York statute fails to do so.
V
A BETrER METHOD TO PROTECT THE INCOMPETENT
PATIENT'S RIGHTS
Several commentators have suggested other methods by which
the state and the medical profession can protect the incompetent
patient's right of self-determination. One suggestion is to have the
patient execute a living will in which the patient states that he or she
does not want to have life unnecessarily prolonged. 171 The living
will has major drawbacks, however, because it cannot react to
changing medical situations, and not every patient has the foresight
to execute a living will. 172 Alternatively, one commentator suggests
that the patient appoint an agent to serve as a surrogate. 173 The
agent can protect the patient's right of self-determination, and give
the physician legally binding consent before the physician issues an
order not to resuscitate. 174 The agency theory, however, fails to ad-
dress the unique and important situation of the incompetent patient
who has not designated a surrogate before losing consciousness.
Therefore, neither approach solves the problem at hand.
For the incompetent patient without a surrogate, states should
combine the Quinlan hospital ethics committee and the Hamlin judi-
cial appointment of a guardian ad litem. Under this procedural
framework, the judicially appointed guardian represents the patient
to the hospital committee, and together they review the patient's
169 See Bedell, Pelle, Maher & Cleary, supra note 128, at 234. The study found that
"239 patients designated DNR patients ... survived to the time of discharge from the
hospital. Thus, 38% of patients designated DNR did not have a cardiac arrest and left
the hospital alive." See also Robert M. Veatch, Deciding Against Resuscitation: Encouraging
Signs and Potential Dangers, 253 J. A.M.A., Jan. 4, 1985, at 77 (another study found that
"only 39% of the patients who would not be resuscitated would be considered terminal,
based on the criterion of having less than a 10% chance of surviving hospitalization").
170 See Veatch, supra note 169, at 77.
171 Note, supra note 88, at 378.
172 Id.
173 See Note, Appointing an Agent, supra note 18.
174 Id. at 1001.
1989] 243
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
known medical and personal history. This method would accord
with the substituted judgment standard much more than the method
embodied in the statute.
The New York statute already provides for a dispute mediation
system which each hospital must establish.175 Each hospital may es-
tablish any system it wishes to resolve disputes over orders not to
resuscitate, for example, if two physicians could not concur in a
medical prognosis. Since the statute already requires a specifically
structured dispute mediation committee, the same committee could
aid in the decisionmaking process for incompetent patients without
a surrogate.
The dispute mediation committee, like the Quinlan ethics com-
mittee, could consist of non-physicians, who would seek to ensure
individualized review weighing important non-medical factors rele-
vant to a DNR decision. Under the current statute, the dispute me-
diation system has seventy-two hours in which to decide a particular
case, a time period which is reasonably efficient, yet allows for a
thorough review.' 76 The committee together with the physician and
a judicially-appointed guardian ad litem could review an incompe-
tent patient's case within this time period. This proposal refers to
only the incompetent patient without a surrogate, not to every DNR
decision. The proposal would not be burdensome because only
rarely does an incompetent patient lack a surrogate.
This inner-hospital committee would function better than judi-
cial resolution, because the judicial system is often slow and costly.
In many of the treatment-refusal cases, the patient died before the
court reviewed the case.' 77 Thejudiciary can appoint a guardian ad
litem relatively easily,1 78 and the guardian ad litem can then repre-
sent the incompetent patient's non-medical wishes. The court ap-
pointment thus provides another procedural safeguard for the
incompetent patient's right of self-determination.
These two less-costly, time-saving safeguards would adequately
ensure that the statute protects the incompetent patient's right of
self-determination. Both safeguards demand that someone other
than the physician attempt to determine what the patient would
175 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
176 Id. § 2972(3).
177 See Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re
Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); In re Ham-
lin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
178 The appointment of a guardian ad litem does not require a great deal of the
court's time and can be accomplished fairly quickly. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689
P.2d 1372; see also Note, supra note 37, at 674.
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want to do. The physician provides the medical prognosis for the
patient and the mediation committee issues the order not to resusci-
tate. The system thus guards against any conflicts of interest due to
the cost of resuscitating and maintaining the patient.1 79 In this man-
ner, the incompetent patient's right of self-determination is not lost;
to the greatest degree possible, the patient without a surrogate re-
ceives a complete review of his or her case.
CONCLUSION
Self-determination is the right to exercise control over one's
own body. The right is so basic to each individual that the patient
does not lose such a right although he or she may have lost the ca-
pacity to exercise it. The incompetent patient without a surrogate
thus retains the same rights as the incompetent patient with a surro-
gate. The right of self-determination includes not only the right to
refuse treatment, but also the right to expect treatment. Given an
incompetent patient without a surrogate, the decision must be made
carefully and only after all relevant information has been consid-
ered.
Elizabeth Shaver
179 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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